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Crunch Time: A policy to avoid the “Announcement Effect”  
when terminating a subsidy 
Marc Gürtler, Gernot Sieg 
Technical University at Braunschweig, Germany1 
Abstract 
If the government announces the termination of a subsidy paid for an irreversible investment 
under uncertainty, investors might decide to realize their investment so as to obtain the sub-
sidy. These investors might have postponed an investment if future payment were assured. 
Depending on the degree of uncertainty and the time preference, the termination of the sub-
sidy might cost the government more in toto than granting the subsidy on a continuing basis. 
A better strategy would be to reduce the subsidy in parts rather than to terminate the subsidy 
in its entirety.  
 
JEL-Classification: H3, D11 
Keywords: Irreversibility, Investment, Announcement effect, Subsidy, Tax 
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1. Introduction 
Governments that face tighter budget constraints or changing political majorities might con-
sider cutting subsidies or increasing taxes for investments. Investment expenditures are 
largely irreversible (Henry, 1974); hence investment costs are mostly sunk costs. Furthermore, 
most investments can be delayed. Delay increases cash flows because new information im-
proves the investment decision (McDonald/Siegel, 1986). In addition to the decision rule “in-
vest when the present value of the future cash flows is at least as large as the costs” the firm 
should invest only if the net present value is at least as large as the net present value of the 
delayed investment (Pindyck, 1991). 
Governments pay subsidies to redistribute income or to induce a project that is not realized 
without a subsidy. If the subsidy is offered steadily and is paid at the outset of the investment 
project, then the policy might induce investment at an earlier time because the net present 
value of the subsidy payment is larger if received earlier.  
If the government announces a cut in subsidy, a firm has to choose between investing now, 
thereby receiving the subsidy, and investing later with better information but without a sub-
sidy. Firms that would bring forward their investment if a subsidy cut were to be announced 
have been identified herein. That implies that these firms invest if and only if the subsidy is 
withdrawn. The announcement of a subsidy cut induces the hurried investment activity of 
these firms. This so-called Announcement Effect might be so large that the present value of 
subsidy payments for the government would rise with the announcement of the cut. A better 
strategy than cutting the subsidy completely at once is to cut the subsidy in parts small enough 
to prevent the Announcement Effect.  
The option to delay an investment is valuable (McDonald/Siegel 1986). Teisberg (1993) 
showed that firms might delay the investment or choose smaller, shorter-lead-time technolo-
gies when faced with uncertain regulation. An industry that faces the uncertainty of frequent 
changes in regulation has been considered in her report. In this article, a different case, 
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namely, that a rationally expected change of policy might occur once only, has been studied. 
There are numerous articles that deal with the possibility of trading off flexibility and com-
mitment, based on Spence (1979) and Fudenberg/Tirole (1983); for example, Saloner (1987), 
Mailath (1993), Maggi (1996), and Sadanand/Sadanand (1996). However, this study analyzes 
investors who trade off subsidies and flexibility.  
Subsidies for investment and their gradual reduction are discussed in this article. However, 
the reduction of a subsidy is in our model equivalent to a tax increase, and there is a literature 
that tax reforms have varied effects before they actually are put into practice. Abel (1982) 
showed that temporary cuts in the corporate tax rate could reduce investment even if perma-
nent tax cuts were to stimulate investment.  
 
2. The model 
Following McDonald and Siegel (1986), we consider firms searching for the point in time, 
0 ! t < ", in which it is optimal to invest sunk costs, I ,and receive a project worth V. After 
the project is realized, the firm achieves an uncertain cashflow, Xt , at each future point in 
time t. It is assumed that X follows a geometric Brownian motion 
, (1) 
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, # is the drift parameter, and $ the volatility. 
Furthermore, we assume the existence of a complete and arbitrage-free capital market with 
continuous and frictionless trading possibilities. Let ! be the expected return of an asset 
traded on the capital market, whose price process, Ft ,is perfectly correlated to Xt, i.e.  
. (2) 
In addition, we define % = !&# as the difference between the risk-adjusted rate of return, !, 
(requested by the capital market) and the observed rate of return, #, of the real asset; and r as 
the risk-free rate of return. The assumed market environment assures the existence of a unique 
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00023543 29/10/2008
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risk-neutral probability measure, Q , implying  
. (3) 
Under the risk-neutral measure Q, it is easy to determine the value Vt of the project (Di-
xit/Pindyck, 1994, 182): 
. (4) 
Thus, the process Xt = !"Vt can be regarded as that of a financial asset with dividend yield !. 
Furthermore, Vt follows a geometric Brownian motion  
 (5) 
The investor has the option to delay the project realization and uses all the available informa-
tion to find the optimal point of investment in time # by solving the problem:  
, (6) 
in which Y+ = max{Y, 0} and E(Q) is the expectation operator under the risk-neutral probabil-
ity measure Q. The investment opportunity is analogous to a perpetual American-call option 
on V with strike price I. The value of this option (Dixit/Pindyck, 1994, 136-144) is 
 (7) 
where 
 (8) 
To investigate the effect of taxation or subsidization of the investment, we compare two cases. 
In case A, the investment is subsidized by the government forever. An investor gets a subsidy, 
S, at the outset of the investment project.  
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In case B, by reason of tighter budgetary constraints for example, the government considers 
the termination of the subsidy. Because of legal issues, the government has to announce that 
the subsidy is to be terminated. Thus, in case B, the government subsidizes the investment at 
time t0 but not later. Investors do anticipate the cut and might bring forward their investment. 
For simplification, we do not consider the effects on market prices of government policy but 
assume X and I to be independent of the subsidy.  
First of all, let us analyze case A. Investment at time t0 = 0, which ensures receiving the sub-
sidy, yields . The value of the project considering the option to wait is calculated 
using (7) and (8) as , and thus the investor invests at t0 if . 
If the government does not subsidize the investment at anytime, the necessary condition for an 
immediate project realization is . A comparison of both the conditions shows 
that the subsidy induces investment if  
. (9) 
The goal of a subsidy is to induce investment of firms that otherwise would never invest. Be-
cause this effect does not depend on the announcement of a policy change but on the payment 
of a subsidy, we do not consider them to constitute the Announcement Effect.  
To analyze case B, we consider the announced cut of the subsidy S. The Announcement Ef-
fect occurs if investment at t0 is more profitable than using the option to delay, i.e. if  
. (10) 
Assuming V0 <  (otherwise immediate investment is optimal, independent of S) 
the option value is 
, (11) 
and the firm invests at t0 if 
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00023543 29/10/2008
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. (12) 
Using the definition 
 (13) 
the Announcement Effect occurs if and only if 
. (14) 
It is not difficult to prove (also see Figure 1):  
Lemma 1: 
(a) For a given subsidy S, the function f(V,S) is unimodal with the minimum at 
(S)=!"(I#S)/(!#1). 
(b) f(V=0, S) = I and f( , S) = S for all given subsidies S.  
(c)  is a decreasing function (for all S $ I). 
(d) 0 < V0 <  implies . 
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Figure 1: Characterization of function f and the Announcement effect interval 
 
Figure 1 shows the Announcement Effect interval. Depending on S and V0, the firm chooses 
one of the following options: invest independent of the policy change if S is large; wait for 
new information if S is small; or invest if and only if the subsidy is cut when S belongs to the 
Announcement Effect interval . Inequality (d) of Lemma 1 shows 
that for all 0 < V0 <  , there exists a subsidy S such that (14) is fulfilled, and the An-
nouncement Effect occurs. To summarize, there exist parameter combinations, which induce 
investors to bring forward their investments if a subsidy cut is announced. 
Let us assume that there is exactly one investment opportunity for all investors and subsidy S 
fulfills (14). The investment is realized because the cut is announced, and the government 
pays each investor S at time t0. If the cut is not announced, the government pays either S at 
some time in the future or no subsidy at all, depending on the unknown movement of V. To 
summarize, the announcement of the policy change enhances the net present value of the sub-
sidy payments. Cutting the subsidy is thus not a policy to improve the budget.  
If there are heterogeneous investment opportunities, the occurrence of the Announcement 
I 
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V 
S 
 
 
Announcement 
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Invest anyway 
Wait for new 
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Effect depends not only on the size of the subsidy S but also on different values V0. Conse-
quently, some of the investments are affected by the Announcement Effect whereas others are 
not. Against this background, the announcement of the subsidy cut might improve the budget 
even if the Announcement Effect occurs for some investments.  
 
3. A Policy to prevent Announcement Effects 
This section shows that a government that faces the Announcement Effect problem can cut 
the subsidy completely without causing preventing the Announcement Effect. We assume that 
at time t0, the parameters V0 and S fulfill (14) such that cutting the subsidy increases govern-
ment expenditures. Figure 2 shows the extent to which it is possible to scale down the subsidy 
without inducing an Announcement Effect. The maximum cut in an indefinitely paid subsidy 
without causing the Announcement Effect is made by  < S, which is implicitly defined by 
. (15) 
Because  and , the existence of  is assured. 
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00023543 29/10/2008
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Figure 2: Subsidy  to prevent the Announcement Effect 
 
Cutting the subsidy to  is just the first step if the government aims for a complete cancella-
tion. However, the government cannot easily take the next step following (15) because further 
cuts are rationally anticipated and therefore change the Announcement Effect condition (15).  
Because there might be multiple changes in the subsidy, we have to generalize the An-
nouncement Effect definition. The Announcement Effect occurs at time t if an investor, who 
does not invest at time ! " t, if the subsidy S is paid indefinitely, invests at time t under the 
cutting policy regime. If  for a point in time ! " t then it is optimal to invest at time 
! if the subsidy S is paid. Therefore, we can label an investment as induced by the announce-
ment of the subsidy cut only if  for all ! " t. Consequently, we only consider situa-
tions in which 
 for all ! " t and  < S. (16) 
The remainder of this section deals with the development of a policy that ensures complete 
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cancellation of the subsidy without inducing any firm to bring forward their investment. The 
policy we develop is not optimal in terms of minimizing the subsidy payments of the govern-
ment. The optimal policy depends on the realized values of V and is therefore difficult to im-
plement. Usually, laws that define the conditions for subsidy payments do not refer to future 
values of investment opportunities. By contrast, our policy depends on time only and is easier 
to both implement and communicate. Even though the government is unable to commit to a 
special policy of taxation or subsidization, we assume that the policy is correctly anticipated 
by the concerned firms. Therefore, there is no problem of time inconsistency in our model. 
We do not assume that a policy change is possible at each point in time but assume that there 
is a sequence  (!0 = t0 denotes the present point in time) of equidistant points in 
time, where , when the government is able to cut subsidies, as for example, 
each first day of a year or each last day of the quarter. On this basis, we develop a cutting pol-
icy (S = S0 > S1 > ... > Sn = 0 in which the government pays the subsidy Si for all time inter-
vals ti"1 < t # ti (i $ {1, ..., n"1}) and, for t > tn"1 , the subsidy is completely faded out, i.e. Sn = 
0. Considering the assumption above for each “subsidy time interval” ti"1 < t # ti , there exists 
a natural number mi that implies the length of the time interval such that ti"ti"1 = mi%d.  
In the following section, we calculate Si and the length ti"ti"1 = mi%d of the “subsidy time in-
tervals” by backward induction (i.e. i = n, n"1, …) as long as the initial subsidy S0 = S is met. 
Subsequently, the number n and the points in time ti can be identified by starting at t0 and by 
using the calculated length of the time intervals. 
By starting with Sn = 0 and mn%d & ', the case i = n is easily treated. Now consider an arbi-
trary i # n"1 and assume the induction hypothesis that the cutting rule (S >) Si > … > Sn"1 > 
Sn = 0 is given and that there is no Announcement Effect at ti or later. Against this back-
ground, we have to determine the subsidy Si and the length mi%d of the time interval in which 
this subsidy Si is valid.  
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00023543 29/10/2008
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Obviously, the investment opportunity at a point in time, t, ti!1 < t " ti, corresponds to a per-
petual American option, with n!i+1 increasing strike prices I!Si < ... < I!Sn over the time 
intervals under consideration.2 In an analogous manner as in (6) the corresponding option 
value  at time t, ti!1 < t " ti , can be calculated by 
 (17) 
Andricopoulos et. al. (2003) showed the method for determining the right side of (17) nu-
merically, and thus we regard the value of this type of option as ascertainable. To get a con-
nection to the valuation formula (6) and consequentially an easier characterization of the 
situation, we define a (fictitious) subsidy, , in such a way that the value of the per-
petual American option with constant strike is identical to the perpetual American option with 
decreasing strike prices, i.e. 
 (18) 
From (18), it is easy to deduce some characteristics of the “fictitious” subsidy : 
Lemma 2: 
(a)  is an increasing function in ti!t, 
(b) , and 
(c)  for all t < ti. 
Because (from the induction hypothesis) there is no Announcement Effect in ti and (from (c)) 
, we have no Announcement Effect at any point in time t where ti!1 < t " ti 
                                                
2 The points in time ti are initially unknown. At this point we only need these points in time to give explanations 
and characterizations. 
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because the option to wait is of more value at time t < ti than at time ti. Consequently, we only 
have to analyze the Announcement Effect at the “changeover” point in time t = ti!1 and to de-
termine the subsidy Si!1 on this basis. Obviously, we avoid the Announcement Effect if the 
subsidy Si!1 satisfies the following condition: 
 (19) 
Inequality  and property (a) of Lemma 1 directly imply  
, thus leading (under consideration of (19)) to a prevention of the An-
nouncement Effect if 
. (20) 
Since the duration mn"d of subsidy Sn = 0 tends to infinity it immediately results from Lemma 
2 (b): 
. (21) 
In addition, we have to determine the duration ti!1!ti!2 = mi!1"d of subsidy Si!1. For this reason, 
we need the following statement (see the appendix for details): 
Theorem 1: 
Consider , where . Using the definition , the following 
statements are true: 
(a) . 
(b) If for any length ti!t the inequality  holds, then there exists, for all " > 0, 
a point in time t < ti, such that .  
First, we consider situations in which Si <  (with  as defined in (15)) and thus Theorem 1 
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is applicable using . Second, using Theorem 1 (b), we elect an arbitrary parameter 0 < ! 
<  -which exists since  is positive on the basis of Theorem 1 (a)-  and define  
. (22) 
To summarize, (20) and (22) define the cutting rule. The purpose of (22) is to guarantee the 
minimum step size Si"1"Si >  > 0, because we search for a finite cutting rule. 
We finally have to obtain a prescription for the termination of the procedures (20) and (22). 
As long as Si < , the inequality Si"1 > +Si"! holds, which in turn implies the existence 
of a number i*, where Si*"1 >  > Si*.
3 We define i* 2. Because Lemma 2 (b) leads to the 
convergence  we get the existence of a minimal length m1#d $ 0 of 
the time interval that satisfies . With these parameter specifications, the An-
nouncement Effect is prohibited because 
. (23) 
Repeated application of the induction procedure (20) yields the number n. Adding up all the 
lengths of time intervals, ti"ti"1 (i = 0, …, n"1), yields the entire length (m1+…+mn)#d of the 
cutting period.  
Finally, for a better understanding, the whole policy is presented in a nutshell: 
 (24) 
This policy avoids the Announcement Effect completely. 
 
                                                
3 Actually, we have Si*"1 $  > Si*. If Si*"1 =  will be realized, we change the parameter ! to get Si*"1 > . 
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4. Summary 
If governments want to cut subsidies, they might fear the Announcement Effect: Investors 
realize an investment they would otherwise have postponed if the cut were not announced 
only to get a subsidy. This article identifies the parameter constellations when the cut of a 
subsidy, instead of improving the budget, enlarges the deficit.  
The Announcement Effect interval is relevant from a political economy point of view. Voters 
are in favor of a subsidy because they seek windfall gains. However, if the subsidy is so large 
that anybody invests even without adequate information, the subsidy results in inefficient in-
vestment. This results in negative publicity such that a political majority is at risk. Therefore, 
from the rent seekers point of view the optimal permanent subsidy has to be as large as possi-
ble but small enough to prevent obviously inefficient investment. The politically optimal grant 
is hence prone to the Announcement Effect.  
Accordingly, it is better not to cut the subsidy completely. However, the government is able to 
avoid the negative effects of the announcement and to improve the budget by following the 
cutting rule (24). The government cuts the subsidy incrementally and abolishes it in finite 
time. 
 
Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
Appendix  
Proof of Theorem 1: 
Because 
 (A.1) 
result (a) follows from Lemma 1 (a) and (c). 
In order to verify result (b) let  be an arbitrary real number. According to the 
mean value theorem of differential calculus, there exists a real number  such that 
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 and 
 (A.2) 
Consequently, 
. (A.3) 
Thus, we also get for all ti!t > 0 and  
. (A.4) 
From Lemma 2 (b) and the continuity of f, the convergence 
 (A.5) 
is true and (A.4) in turn implies  
. (A.6) 
Consequently (under consideration of (A.5) and (A.6)) the postulated statement (b) has been 
proved to be true. 
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